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| 9/11 Hijackers: Let Them Go and Help Them Fly |
ABCNEWS has learned that shortly before changing directions, someone in the cockpit radioed in and asked the FAA for a new flight plan, with a final destination of Washington.
9:30 a.m.: Flight 93 Requests a New Flight Plan
Shortly before Flight 93 reverses direction and heads east, someone in its cockpit radios in and asks the FAA for a new flight plan, with a final destination of Washington, DC. [ABC News, 9/11/2001; ABC News, 9/14/2001] Jeff Krawczyk, the chief operating officer of a company that tracks aircraft movements, later comments, “We hardly ever get a flight plan change. Very unusual.” [Washington Business Journal, 9/11/2001] Who it is that makes this request is unclear. The hijacker takeover of Flight 93 occurred around 9:28 a.m. (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001) [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 11] , so it is presumably made by one of the hijackers. Twenty-five minutes later the pilot hijacker will also program a new destination into the plane’s navigational system (see 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Versions are
"9:30 a.m.: Someone aboard United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco tells controllers the pilot wants to change their flight plan.
"All they [those on board] know is that the pilot or someone in the cockpit is requesting clearance to Washington, D.C.," says Stark. "I'm sure they were fearing the worst.""
Daniel M. Plesse shared a link.
Just now
al-Mihdhar was calling the Yemeni safe house from inside the United States.
On learning that al-Mihdhar was in the United States, the agent said he urged superiors to allow criminal investigators in the New York office to help find al-Mihdhar. But FBI officials in Washington refused, saying al-Mihdhar was not under criminal investigation, and citing a "wall" between criminal and intelligence matters.
al-Mihdhar was calling the Yemeni safe house from inside the United States.
On learning that al-Mihdhar was in the United States, the agent said he urged superiors to allow criminal investigators in the New York office to help find al-Mihdhar. But FBI officials in Washington refused, saying al-Mihdhar was not under criminal investigation, and citing a "wall" between criminal and intelligence matters.
Text from book
"By September 4, 2001, the FBI had finally notified the State Department about the revocation status of al Mihdhar's visa. In fact, specific instructions were given to stop al Mihdhar and detain him for questioning, as he was considered armed and dangerous and participating in terrorist activities, one of which included potential hijackings. Oddly, the very next day, on September 5, 2001, the order to withhold al Mihdhar was reversed. According to the 9/11 Commission's final report, on September 5 the State Department put out a new directive regarding al Mihdhar: to let him go. Specifically, the entry reads that al Mihdhar was a potential witness in an FBI investigation and not to detain him. Quite a chilling directive given that a mere six days later he would be crashing a hijacked plane into the Pentagon. "
So were is this source? Could it be this:????
"U. S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
A Review of the FBI's Handling of
Intelligence Information Related to the
September 11 Attacks (November 2004) 449 page report
Page 312
After her meeting with Donna on August 22, 2001, Mary asked another
CTC officer to draft a CIR to the State Department, INS, U.S. Customs
Service, and FBI requesting the placement of Mihdhar and his travel
companions, Hazmi and Salah Saeed Muhammed bin Yousaf, on U.S.
watchlists. This is the first record of the placement of Mihdhar
CTC officer to draft a CIR to the State Department, INS, U.S. Customs
Service, and FBI requesting the placement of Mihdhar and his travel
companions, Hazmi and Salah Saeed Muhammed bin Yousaf, on U.S.
watchlists. This is the first record of the placement of Mihdhar
or Hazmi on any U.S. watchlist. On August 23, 2001, Donna contacted
the State Department and requested a copy of Mihdhar’s most recent
visa application from the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
the State Department and requested a copy of Mihdhar’s most recent
visa application from the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
page 313
where is the wall defined? Isn’t it dealing with FISA information? I think everyone is still confusing this issue…someday someone will die – and wall or not – the public
will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’
will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’
(Fake Walls, Fake Issues, Protect Terrorist at all costs)
biggest threat to us now, UBL, is getting the most ‘protection’.
Richard told the OIG that he began to work on locating Mihdhar on
September 4. He stated that he had received the assignment on Thursday,
August 30, but he worked all weekend and Monday on another exigent
investigative matter involving a Canadian hijacking. As a result, he said he did
not have the opportunity to begin work on the Mihdhar investigation until
Tuesday, September 4
September 4. He stated that he had received the assignment on Thursday,
August 30, but he worked all weekend and Monday on another exigent
investigative matter involving a Canadian hijacking. As a result, he said he did
not have the opportunity to begin work on the Mihdhar investigation until
Tuesday, September 4
Checkbox snafu
On September 4, Richard completed a lookout request for the INS,
identifying Mihdhar as a potential witness in a terrorist investigation. Due to
his unfamiliarity with completing the lookout form, Richard contacted an INS
Special Agent who was assigned to the FBI’s JTTF in New York. We call this
Special Agent “Patrick.” The INS lookout form has a box indicating whether
the individual was wanted for “security/terrorism” reasons. Richard did not
check this box. He said that he thought Patrick told him to identify the subject
on the form as a witness, not a potential terrorist, to prevent overzealous
immigration officials from overreacting. By contrast, Patrick, who was
assigned to the JTTF since September 1996, told us that he did not provide this
advice to Richard and he always checked the security/terrorism box whenever
he completed the lookout form for a potential witness in a terrorism
investigation
Is "Mary" = "CA Assistant Secretary Mary Ryan"??? "Visas Viper"??
identifying Mihdhar as a potential witness in a terrorist investigation. Due to
his unfamiliarity with completing the lookout form, Richard contacted an INS
Special Agent who was assigned to the FBI’s JTTF in New York. We call this
Special Agent “Patrick.” The INS lookout form has a box indicating whether
the individual was wanted for “security/terrorism” reasons. Richard did not
check this box. He said that he thought Patrick told him to identify the subject
on the form as a witness, not a potential terrorist, to prevent overzealous
immigration officials from overreacting. By contrast, Patrick, who was
assigned to the JTTF since September 1996, told us that he did not provide this
advice to Richard and he always checked the security/terrorism box whenever
he completed the lookout form for a potential witness in a terrorism
investigation
Is "Mary" = "CA Assistant Secretary Mary Ryan"??? "Visas Viper"??
page 107
"Following the 9/11 attacks, CA Assistant Secretary Mary Ryan met with CIA Director George Tenet, and expressed her frustration with the CIA’s failure to provide State with the names of two 9/11 hijackers: Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, whose names were in the possession of the CIA as early as January 2000. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and this meeting between Ryan and Tenet, Visas Viper experienced a “dramatic” increase in submissions. Mary Ryan interview (Sept. 29, 2003).
Email today
from Wake-Up Call: The Political Education of a 9/11 Widow Kristen Breitweiser page 193
"Oddly, the very next day, on September 5, 2001, the order to withhold al Mihdhar was reversed. According to the 9/11 Commission's final report, on September 5 the State Department put out a new directive regarding al Mihdhar: to let him go. Specifically, the entry reads that al Mihdhar was a potential witness in an FBI investigation and not to detain him. Quite a chilling directive given that a mere six days later he would be crashing a hijacked plane into the Pentagon"
My question is were exactly is this footnote in the 9/11 commission report pdf ? Thanks dan
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9:59 AM (2 hours ago)
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Dear Mr. Plesse,
Thank you for contacting the Center for Legislative Archives. The reference from Ms. Breitweiser's book cited in your inquiry does not come from the 9/11 Commission's final report, but rather the additional material collected by the Commission and posted to their site under the "staff statements" tab:
In particular, you can find the reference to the actions of the State Dept. on Sept. 5, 2011, at the bottom of page 32 of the 'Terrorist Travel Monograph':
Please let me know if you have any questions,
Adam Berenbak
Al Mihdar is considered a muscle hijacker and would NOT have been connect to hijacker leader i.e the Maine Atta or the Florida Atta and no direct connection to any of i.e pilots on flight 77 aircraft or any larger schemes bombs, weapons to maximize efficiency for clean up operations or dustify the towers. .. muscle hijackers could be clueless and if discovered replaced by many others.. The web of all the muscle low skill labor "hijackers" might have military connected and background and were protected at the highest levels and would be a red herring to discover any of the larger plot.
Though Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi came to the United States as early as
January 2000, the remaining muscle entered between April 23, 2001, and June 29, 2001.
They arrived in six pairs and one trio. Four pairs were processed by the same immigration
inspector. Only three of the muscle were referred to a secondary inspection for further
scrutiny. Of these, only one, Mohamed al Kahtani, was refused entry to the United States.
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf
9/11 September 5th from State Department: Do Not Arrest Hijackers
TIME BOMB: FBI EMAIL REVEALS 9/11 FEAR
BRIAN BLOMQUIST in Washington and MURRAY WEISS in New York. New York Post; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]21 Sep 2002: 001.
"
The FBI man said he he'd been told by superiors to lay off al- Mihdhar because it would violate the legal "wall" that prevented overseas intelligence from being used in criminal prosecutions."
The FBI agent said he first learned about al-Mihdhar in the spring of
"
2001 through a source who claimed that someone bringing money to the chief suspect in the [Cole] attack had met with al- Mihdhar in Malaysia.
CIA, FBI's inaction on tips rapped President joins call for 9-11 probe: [Final Edition]
Greg Miller Los Angeles Times. Journal - Gazette; Ft. Wayne, Ind. [Ft. Wayne, Ind]21 Sep 2002: 1A.
Al-Mihdharhad met with a key planner of that attack in Malaysia in January 2000.
On learning that al-Mihdhar was in the United States, the agent said he urged superiors to allow criminal investigators in the New York office to help find al-Mihdhar. But FBI officials in Washington refused, saying al-Mihdhar was not under criminal investigation, and citing a "wall" between criminal and intelligence matters.
The 28-page document, "Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters," is the only portion of a 2003 joint Senate-House report on the 9/11 attacks that had not been released to the public. Indeed, only a small number of Senators and congressional representatives, along with members of the 9/11 Commission, which was led by former Gov. Tom Kean of New Jersey, were allowed to read it -- and then only with the promise that they would not talk about it.
To read the declassified version of Part Four, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 ("the 28 pages" report), click here.
To read the declassified executive summary of the 2005 FBI-CIA joint assessment on Saudi Government support for terrorism, click here.
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Executive_Summary_of_Joint_FBI-CIA_Report_on_Extent_of_Saudi_Government_Support_for_Terrorism.pdf
A Review of the FBI's handling of
Intelligence Information related to the
September 11 Attacks (November 2004)
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0606/final.pdf
328 pages
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/final.pdf
Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombings investigation or PENTTBOM
"In addition, 29 detainees were citizens of Israel"
I-44A Squad Unit created by the FBI's New York Field Office to follow up on PENTTBOM leads. This squad also had responsibility for clearing detainees arrested in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation in the New York City area
PENTTBOM Name given to the FBI's investigation of the September 11, 2001, Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombings.
The number of agents and other FBI personnel that have been sent abroad temporarily to work on such investigations is significant. For example, according to recent congressional testimony, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and throughout the following year, about 700 FBI personnel were temporarily assigned overseas to work on PENTTBOM.15
Chapter Four
The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui.
Kristen Breitweiser Don't arrest those Hijackers https://twitter.com/kdbreitweiserAl-Mihdharhad met with a key planner of that attack in Malaysia in January 2000.
On learning that al-Mihdhar was in the United States, the agent said he urged superiors to allow criminal investigators in the New York office to help find al-Mihdhar. But FBI officials in Washington refused, saying al-Mihdhar was not under criminal investigation, and citing a "wall" between criminal and intelligence matters.
To read the declassified version of Part Four, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 ("the 28 pages" report), click here.
To read the declassified executive summary of the 2005 FBI-CIA joint assessment on Saudi Government support for terrorism, click here.
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Executive_Summary_of_Joint_FBI-CIA_Report_on_Extent_of_Saudi_Government_Support_for_Terrorism.pdf
A Review of the FBI's handling of Intelligence Information related to the September 11 Attacks (November 2004)
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0606/final.pdf
328 pages
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0506/final.pdf
Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombings investigation or PENTTBOM
"In addition, 29 detainees were citizens of Israel"
| I-44A Squad | Unit created by the FBI's New York Field Office to follow up on PENTTBOM leads. This squad also had responsibility for clearing detainees arrested in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation in the New York City area |
| PENTTBOM | Name given to the FBI's investigation of the September 11, 2001, Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombings. |
The number of agents and other FBI personnel that have been sent abroad temporarily to work on such investigations is significant. For example, according to recent congressional testimony, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and throughout the following year, about 700 FBI personnel were temporarily assigned overseas to work on PENTTBOM.15
Chapter Four
The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui.
The Cruz Imposture
Stephens, Bret
. Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]15
Dec 2015: A.13
[9/11 hijacker Khalid] al-Mihdhar was calling the Yemeni safe house from inside the United States.". Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]15 Dec 2015: A.13
9/11 Iron Man
http://www.truth-out.org/files/inspector-general-complaint-911-iron-man.pdf
U. S. Department ofJustice Office of the Inspector General
A Review of the FBI's Handling of
Intelligence Information Related to the
September 11 Attacks (November 2004)
video
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evsupp2011
Do governments create "terrorists"? Do they use "terrorist organisations" to conduct false-flag attacks around the planet to further geo-political goals? Is the deliberate murder of innocent civilians an important part of this strategy? The answer to all these questions is YES. This brave man took on and exposed CIA/NATO Deep State criminality. His words are relevant. Former Italian President Francesco Cossiga, revealed the existence of the CIA run Operation Gladio, an operation where the CIA/NATO sanctioned indiscriminate bomb attacks throughout Europe leading to the deaths and maiming of thousands of innocent men, women and children (The Bologna Railway Station where 83 people died is a prime example). These attacks were blamed on totally innocent parties. Sound familiar? The Strategy of Tension: “You had to attack civilians, the innocent people, unknown people far removed from any political game. The reason was quite simple: To force the public to turn to the state for greater security”..... Gladio Operative, Vincenzo Vinciguerra. 2001. This is the political logic that lies behind all the massacres and the bombings which remain unpunished, because the state cannot convict itself or declare itself responsible for what happened. Former Italian President Francesco Cossiga told Italy's oldest and most widely read newspaper that the 9-11 terrorist attacks were a False flag attack run by the Mossad, and the CIA and that this was common knowledge among global intelligence agencies. He told the newspaper Corriere della Sera: "All democratic circles in America and of Europe, especially those of the Italian centre-left, now know that the disastrous attack was planned and realized by the American CIA and Mossad with the help of the Zionist world, to place the blame on Arab countries and to persuade the Western powers to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan". Al Qaeda = ISIS/Daesh = CIA/MI5/Mossad. All one and the same, serving the same bankster masters, all with the same goal.
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evsupp2011
Many such operatives are active on this thread. They are very obvious. Best ignored. Share this film at every opportunity. Discuss with friends and family. Every share hastens their demise. Operation Earnest Voice "State-sponsored internet sockpuppetry is a government's use of paid internet propagandists with the intention of swaying online opinion, undermining dissident communities, or changing the perception of what is the dominant view (often via astroturfing)". Refer to: How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive, and Destroy Reputations https://theintercept.com/2014/
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1. Mohamed Atta Mohamed Atta flight 11 FL DL, 05/02/01 2. Marwan al Shehhi or 20. Marwan Al-Shehhi flight 175 FL DL, 04/12/01 FL DL duplicate, 6/19/01 3. Khalid al Mihdhar or 15. Khalid Al-Midhar Flight 77 CA DL, 04/05/00 USA ID card, 07/10/01 VA ID card, 08/01/01 4. Nawaf al Hazmi or Nawaq Alhamzi flight 77 CA DL, 04/05/00 FL DL, 06/25/01 USA ID card, 07/10/01 VA ID card, 08/02/01 5.Hani Hanjour flight 77 AZ DL, 11/29/91 FL ID card, 04/15/96 VA ID card, 08/01/01 Failed VA DL test, 08/02/01 MD ID card, 09/05/01 6.Ziad Jarrah or Ziad Jarrahi flight 93 FL DL, 05/02/01 FL DL duplicate 5/24/01 VA ID card, 08/29/01 7.Satam al Suqami or Satam Al Suqami flight 11 No DL or ID card 8.Waleed al Shehri or Waleed M. Alshehri flight 11 FL DL, 05/04/01 (duplicate issued with different address, 05/05/01) 9.Ahmed al Ghamdi or Ahmed Alghamdi flight 175 USA ID card, 07/2001 VA ID card, 08/02/2001 10.Majed Moqed flight 77 USA ID card, 07/2001 VA ID card, 08/02/2001 11.Hamza al Ghamdi or Hamza Alghamdi flight 175 FL ID card, 06/26/01 FL DL, 07/02/01 (duplicate issued 08/27/01) 12.Mohand al Shehri or Mohald Alshehri flight 175 FL ID card, 07/02/01 13. Ahmed al Nami or Ahmed Alnami flight 93 FL DL, 06/29/01 14. Wail al Shehri or Wail Alshehri flight 11 FL DL, 07/03/01 15. Ahmed al Haznawi or Ahmed Alhaznawi flight 93 FL DL, 07/10/00 (duplicate issued 09/07/01) 16. Fayez Banihammad or Fayez Banihamm ad or Fayez Ahmed flight 175 FL ID, 07/10/01 17. Saeed al Ghamdi or Saeed Alghamdi flight 93 FL ID card, 07/10/01 18. Salem al Hazmi or Salem Alhamzi flight 77 USA ID card, 07/01/01197 VA ID card, 08/02/01 19. Abdul Aziz al Omari Missing or Abdulaziz Alomari flight 11USA ID card, 07/10/2001 VA ID card, 08/02/2001 11-19 hijackers issued visas by the same consular officer Atta and Shehhi were reportedly offered jobs as co-pilots for a new airline, “Flair” by Huffman’s president, Rudi Dekkers. FBI draft report of investigation, interview of Nicole Antini, Sept. 13, 2004.
