September 11th Funding CIA IG Report

Shaikh — member of San Diego Police Commission, FBI informant, took hijackers into his Lemon Grove home

UAE 9/11 Funding German Proxies

In regard to the 9/11 hijackers' finances, subsequent investigation indicates that the terrorists began funding their operation nearly two years in advance. According to Counter terrorist Center (CTC) analysts, the 19 hijackers opened 24 US-based checking accounts; each hijacker had at least one account in his name, and three were Jointly held. Funding for the accounts originated in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but the terrorists used facilitators in Germany to obscure this. While in the United States, the hijackers dealt almost exclusively in cash or debit cards and kept their transactions below $10,000. According to officers in CTC nothing in the hijackers' financial behavior would have raised a red flag at that time. 

Robert Scheer Discusses CIA 9/11 IG Report On "Countdown" - 10/21/2004

Sarah, It looks like the SEIB I would like to look at is  the August 7th, 2001 and maybe the reason for the delay.. My request was for the 6th. I wish to update, revise etc.

C-span 

GORELICK: The SEIB. 

ASHCROFT: ... was available to me. 

GORELICK: On August 7th, 2001, a SEIB that reflected much of -- although it was not identical to --much of the content of the August 6th presidential daily brief came out. And I would like to ask you if you remember seeing a document headed, Terrorism: Bin Laden Determined To Strike In The United States, in the SEIB. 

ASHCROFT: I do not remember seeing that. I was in -- I believe I was in Chicago speaking at the American Bar Association meeting, I believe, at the time. So I do not have a recollection of seeing that. 

GORELICK: Did your staff regularly brief you on the intelligence when you returned? 

ASHCROFT: I was briefed, and items of interest were noted for me from time to time by my staff. 

GORELICK: Would something like this, which is a memorandum that is going out to your colleagues, hundreds of your colleagues in the government, saying that bin Laden is determined to strike in the United States, been an item of significance that you would think would have been briefed to you? 

ASHCROFT: These items had been briefed to me. They had been briefed to me by the FBI, they have been briefed to me by the CIA. The administration asked me to get briefings when appropriate in regard to these measures. I remember Ms. Rice, for example, early in July, during the threat period and the heightened and elevated threat, asking me if I would receive a briefing from the CIA because she thought it important. It's that kind of briefing that I received early. The CIA, we have reconstructed it from the slides they used, talked a lot about the threat overseas. And we, obviously, were aware of the historical information that Osama bin Laden had issued statements years before, much of which is in the SEIB and was in the August 6th PDB, which I have now read. 

 In August, UBL Station disseminated recent information that the FBI had received from a Palestinian walk in—• Later in August, that UBL operative Abu Zubaydah was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States.  While none of these cables offered specifics, analysts made no mention of them in published warning pieces prior to 9/11, including in the 6 August PDB.

In mid-August 2001 XXXX sent out requests for information on Zacarias Moussaoui, who had been arrested in Minnesota earlier in the month. These cables noted Moussaoui's enrollment in flight lessons and his praise of Islamic martyrdom.



Who was the XXXX 1. CIA 2. UBL Station or the 3. FBI.. Was Zacarias Moussaoui arrest added to SEIB's or PDB's?? after August 15th

During their time in Kuala Lumpur, the al-Qa'ida associates met in an apartment. After the associates' departure, identified the owner as Yazid Sufaat, later revealed to be a Malaysian chemist and extremist who also hosted Zacarias Moussaoui in fall 2000. Despite UBL Station's desire to keep track of the travelers in Bangkok, received the information about their arrival too late to conduct surveillance and did not learn of their mid-January departure from Thailand until early March. (See Appendix F5.b-1 at the end of this section for a chronological account of the cables involved


afforded two occasions in which CIA officers had sufficient information to nominate future 9/11 hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi for State Department's watchlist:





Was al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi added to SEIB's or PDB's?? after August 15th?



• In August, UBL Station disseminated recent information that the FBI had received from a Palestinian walk-in—• Later in August, that UBL operative Abu Zubaydah was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States.

While none of these cables offered specifics, analysts made no mention of them in published warning pieces prior to 9/11, including in the 6 August PDB.

•
In mid-August 20011 XXXX sent out requests for information on Zacarias Moussaoui, who had been arrested in Minnesota earlier in the month. These cables noted Moussaoui's enrollment in flight lessons and his praise of Islamic martyrdom.

During their time in Kuala Lumpur, the al-Qa'ida associates met in an apartment. After the associates' departure, identified the owner as Yazid Sufaat, later revealed to be a Malaysian chemist and extremist who also hosted Zacarias Moussaoui in fall 2000. Despite UBL Station's desire to keep track of the travelers in Bangkok, received the information about their arrival too late to conduct surveillance and did not learn of their mid-January departure from Thailand until early March. (See Appendix F5.b-1 at the end of this section for a chronological account of the cables involved

afforded two occasions in which CIA officers had sufficient information to nominate future 9/11 hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi for State Department's watchlist: