NMCC was on that net and hearing everything at FAA and so no formal communication was required the 9/11 Commission was a scam
Monte Belger, FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 9/11, said: `Prior to 9/11, the procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft were in place and pretty well tested. . . . It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my thirty years of experience with the FAA. that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time ... In my thirty years of history, there was always somebody listening to that net ... it is a fact — there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were participating in what was on." 293
The military's 46 drills thus Military added smoke into the system
NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) runs a training exercise called Fertile Rice "scenario of Osama bin Laden attacking a prominent target in the Washington, DC, area, using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
"Gradually — and still before 9/11 — NORAD was assigned additional missions and responsibilities. Among these, the support of counter-drugs operations, including the tracking of small aircraft entering or operating within the U.S. and Canada. Commercial aircraft were not perceived to be a threat then ...
So during the 2001 "summer of threat" they changed the Hijack Protocol
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3610.01A (dated 1 June 2001) was issued for the purpose of providing "guidance to the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), National Military Command Center (NMCC), and operational commanders in the event of an aircraft piracy (hijacking) or request for destruction of derelict airborne objects." This new instruction superseded CJCSI 3610.01 of 31 July 1997. Reference D refers to Department of Defense Directive 3025.15 (Feb. 18, 1997) which allows for commanders in the field to provide assistance to save lives in an emergency situation -- BUT any requests involving "potentially lethal support" (including "combat and tactical vehicles, vessels or aircraft; or ammunition") must still be approved by the Secretary of Defense. So again, the ability to respond to a hijacking in any meaningful fashion, is stripped from the commanders in the field.
Interestingly, only three months before 9/11, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Staff Instruction CVJCSI 3610.01A, instructing NORAD on how to deal with “AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND DESTRUCTION OF DERELICT AIRBORNE OBJECTS.”Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3610.01A (dated 1 June 2001) was issued for the purpose of providing "guidance to the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), National Military Command Center (NMCC), and operational commanders in the event of an aircraft piracy (hijacking) or request for destruction of derelict airborne objects." This new instruction superseded CJCSI 3610.01 of 31 July 1997. Reference D refers to Department of Defense Directive 3025.15 (Feb. 18, 1997) which allows for commanders in the field to provide assistance to save lives in an emergency situation -- BUT any requests involving "potentially lethal support" (including "combat and tactical vehicles, vessels or aircraft; or ammunition") must still be approved by the Secretary of Defense. So again, the ability to respond to a hijacking in any meaningful fashion, is stripped from the commanders in the field.
Monte Belger, FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 9/11, said: `Prior to 9/11, the procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft were in place and pretty well tested. . . . It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my thirty years of experience with the FAA. that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time ... In my thirty years of history, there was always somebody listening to that net ... it is a fact — there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were participating in what was on." 293
After her testimony FAA director Jane Garvey suspected ....
