According to the Tom Brokaw interview with Boston controllers who first noticed problems with Flight 11 they began moving other planes out it's way at 8:20 am and considered it to be a "runaway plane". At that point NORAD NEADS in Rome , New York should have seen on it's own radar scopes what was happening and could monitor the radio transmissions of all the planes being orderded out of the way. NORAD at Griffiss AFB was on exactly the flight path Flight 11 had turned toward when it went of it off course which should have raised suspicions with transponder being turned off and all the radio traffic concerning it. None of this should have required a phone call from the FAA.
Since the pilot of Flight 11 was an air force veteran he would have known where NORAD was located and may have still been flying at that point deliberately trying to get NORAD's attention. It makes no sense for the hijackers to have turned northwest when they wanted to go south to New York.
Fighters at Syracuse might not have been "on alert" but could have been sent up within ten minutes in an unarmed mode yet were not. Since a "traditional hijack" did not require a shootdown but merely an intercept and tailing five miles behind why bring in armed fighters from Otis when Syracuse was much closer to Flight 11 and unarmed planes were all that was necessary under standard hijack procedures? Once unarmed fighters were up with on-board targeting radar to lock onto the hijacked planes it would be easy to vector in the armed fighters if necessary.
CJCSI 3610.01A - i June 2001: The NORAD Stand Down Order of 9/11" by John Page Interestingly, only three months before 9/11, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Staff Instruction CVJCSI 3610.01A, instructing NORAD on how to deal with “AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND DESTRUCTION OF DERELICT AIRBORNE OBJECTS.” i.e Stand down order "The instruction specified that NORAD will provide “escort service” when requested by “the FAA Hijack Coordinator,” and specifically excluded the “use of military aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopter) or other vehicles as platforms for gunfire or the use of other weapons against suspected hijackers.” FACT: In the decade before 9/11, NORAD intercepted only one civilian plane over North America: golfer Payne Stewart's Learjet, in October 1999 Response According to the Calgary Herald, in 2000 there are 425 “unknowns,” where an aircraft’s pilot has not filed or has deviated from a flight plan, or has used the wrong radio frequency, and fighters are scrambled 129 times in response.8:13: Boston Ground control loses contact with Flight 11. First red flag for Flight 11. 8:20: Flight 11 reaches the Hudson River in NY and stops transmitting its 8:20 am and considered it to be a "runaway plane". Second Red flag IFF signal. third Red flag for Flight 11 RIV M3: 1443
8:24: Hijackers on Flight 11 accidentally broadcasts warning to the passengers over its radio: "Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." Third Red Flag for Flight 11 Since Sept. 11, 2001, NORAD fighters have scrambled or diverted from air patrols in the U.S. Northern Command Area of Responsibility more than 2,000 times to respond to possible air threats, and have combined with Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and air-to-air-refueling aircraft to fly more than 40,000 sorties. At some unknown point after the hijacking begins, Flight 11's talkback button is activated, which enables Boston flight controllers to hear what is being said in the cockpit. It is unclear whether John Ogonowski, the pilot, activates the talkback button, or whether a hijacker accidentally does so when he takes over the cockpit. A controller later says, “The button [is] being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York.” An article later notes that “his ability to do so also indicates that he [is] in the driver's seat much of the way” to the WTC. Such transmissions continue until about 8:38 a.m. [Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/15/2001] However, Ogonowski fails to punch a four-digit emergency code into the plane's transponder, which pilots are taught to do the moment a hijack situation is known (see (8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Christian Science Monitor, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/13/2001; Boston Globe, 11/23/2001] Hello I am reviewing your "PROTOCOLS FOR RESPONDING TO HIJACKINGS " http://www.rutgerslawreview.com/2011/4-american-11/#_ednref and I am wondering why at 8:14 ATC directed Flight 11 to take a 20 degrees right taking flight 11 off course and off its intended flight path and into incoming traffic? Why then did ATC only address the communication issue? The issues of flight 11 was having were many and the response seemed muted and based on only one issue i.e the communications issue There seems to be completely blind to the direction i.e heading flying out of control, midair disaster .. So far no one seems bothered by the fact that Flight 11 flying to Canada and directly at NEAS and the 109th Airlift Wing... 8:20 was the time the beacon was lost. 8:14 was both the turn and the last communications.. I still don't know the reason of the 20 degree turn.. controllers shall assign Code 7500 to the aircraft.
F-15 fighters jets intercepted two planes from Barnes Air National Guard which was 18 miles from flight 11 at 08:16:03 Reinf 2015
1990-2001: NORAD Regularly Launches Fighters to Intercept Suspicious Aircraft before 9/11
CJCSI 3610.01A - i June 2001: The NORAD Stand Down Order of 9/11 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dorian-de-wind/norads-performance-on-911_b_975812.html http://themoderatevoice.com/did-norad-%E2%80%98conspire%E2%80%99-on-911/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20themoderatevoice%20%28The%20Moderate%20Voice%29 Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Nasypany, mission-crew commander, on the "ops" floor at the Northeast Air Defense Sector Check out the beacon for Flight 175, 11, 77 and 93
Flight 175 beacon
08:23:51 Reinf M3: 1470 08:45:48 Reinf Radar: RIV M3: 1470 08:46:36 Reinf Radar: RIV M3: 3020 midair switch 08:51:24 Reinf Radar: RIV M3: 3321 switch again 08:57:59 Reinf Radar: RIV M3: 3321
Flight 11 beacon
08:12:51 Reinf Radar: RIV M3: 1443 08:20:38 Search Radar: RIV M3: M2: Mode C (ft): Height (ft): 31200 beacon lost remained lostFlight 93 beacon
08:44:24 Reinf Radar: GIB M3: 1527
09:40:13 Search Radar: DTW M3: M2: Mode C (ft): Height (ft): Altitude (m): 0
09:40 total loss of radar
09:40 total loss of radar
Flight 77 beacon
08:34:46 Reinf Radar: PLA M3: 6553
08:40:55 Reinf Radar: PLA M3: 3743 beacon switch
08:50:27 Reinf Radar: PLA M3: 3743 total loss after 8:50
Radar REM
J-55 Z-312 Remsen NY ARSR-4 43°20′43″N 075°14′56″W EADS AEA Eastern New FAA/USAF JSS radar site; replaced Watertown AFS, NY (Z-49). Also called 'Starr Hill. Response " Flight 11 flew right at Northeast Air Defense Squadron on 9/11 in Rome New York and the dog did not bark.. Flew in the wrong direction for 8:14 until 8:26.. Then turned for home near Northeast Air Defense Squadron Rome New York and the 109th Airlift Squadron - Wikipedia did nothing..https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QxsDd5yM8U popular mechanics "from cockpit recordings to forensics".. Response The flights were off their flight paths for over 2 hours 6 minutes. We should have exactly 2 hours and 6 minutes of records and we don't.. Total Flying Time by Hijackers on 9/11: 2 hours and 6 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IVFhAmrKoGI Passenger windows on a piece of Flight 175's fuselage.. Wrong color to be flight 175.. https://goo.gl/photos/32T5hwqjnctwGgxK6 conclusion every word of popular mechanics is total junk.. http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a5654/debunking-911-myths-planes/
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